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Abstract
Application of Agent-Based Modeling: Simulating Financial Systemic Risk and
Contagion within Housing and Financial Markets
By
Faizan Khan
Claremont Graduate University: 2019
This dissertation presents an agent-based model (ABM) to model systemic risk in the housing
and financial markets from 1986 to 2017 and provides a unique approach to simulating the financial market along with demonstrating the phenomenon of emergence resulting from the interconnected-behavior of consumers, banks and the Federal Reserve. Consumers can buy or rent properties, and these agents own characteristics such as income and may be employed or unemployed.
Banks own balance sheets to monitor their assets and liabilities and participate in the interbank
lending market with one another. This tool can model the complexities within the United States’
housing market, conduct stress tests as interest rates fluctuate, and explore characteristics from the
landmark financial crisis and epidemic of foreclosures. The blend of available financial products
to consumers (i.e., ARM versus Fixed-Rate) certainly influences demand to purchase properties
given that ARM products are more affordable than fixed-rate products; however, these specific
products may increase the risk of “underwater” mortgages. The market value of a property is heavily influenced by the value of a neighboring property; therefore, individuals are able to gauge the
probable value of a property that has not been developed yet. The blend of available financial
products to consumers (i.e., ARM versus Fixed-Rate) certainly influences demand within the housing market given that ARM products are more affordable than fixed-rate products. Overall, these
concepts are important as the understanding of the impact from increases in foreclosed properties,
changes in rates, available financial products, and more can help policymakers and financial institutions understand and model the non-linear complexities within the housing market.
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Introduction
For many Americans, the opportunity to own a home is part of the “American Dream.” Home
ownership allows individuals to secure an asset that may potentially appreciate in value over time.
The Real Estate Crash of 2007, which transitioned into a global financial crisis, is presently the
closest event to a modern-day Great Depression. It was initially a banking and securities crisis,
which then evolved into an economic crisis. Diminishing house prices influenced some individuals
to strategically default on their payments as their mortgage transformed into an underwater mortgage (i.e., unpaid loan balance is greater than market value of property). Others defaulted without
choice due to catastrophic events such as becoming unemployed. These defaults inevitably led to
foreclosure of properties. The foreclosure “contagion effect” mimics the concept of a virus spreading into an environment from carrying hosts; therefore, as the number of foreclosed properties in
a neighborhood increases, the prices of homes surrounding an “infected host(s)” may be negatively
impacted. An immense amount of defaults and delinquent payments harmed the income of banks,
and these financial institutions struggled to meet debt obligations to other banks. As a result, housing prices depreciated, and interbank lending tightened.
Researchers attempted to understand the housing market crisis by analyzing various potential
determinants such as: monetary policy implemented by the Federal Reserve, the role of sub-prime
mortgages and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), lending standards by the financial services sector, and the list continues; however, there is not a consensus as to what truly caused the U.S. to
tumble into this detrimental position. What if it was a “perfect storm” including everything listed
above plus more? Both, the housing market and financial crisis, are prime examples of complexity.
Complex in the sense that there were several underlying factors that contributed to the bubble and
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crisis. Although these factors may seem like dozens of mismatched puzzle pieces, they are quite
interconnected.
The purpose of this dissertation is to describe and demonstrate a simulation tool, which may
be helpful for modeling historical, present, and future phenomena related to concepts such as the
foreclosure contagion effect between properties, risk mitigation and management of financial balance sheets, and the impact political economic shocks have on the economy. This model allows us
to understand and replicate the behavior of consumers and financial institutions and analyze the
impact to the environment from changes in interest rates set by central banks. More specifically,
this agent-based model simulates and measures systemic risk within the U.S. housing and interbank markets—a complex adaptive system. After the model initializes, I perform stress tests and
sensitivity analyses to assess a variety of outputs given specific inputs such as interest rate fluctuations, contagion, etc. These stress tests also demonstrate the feedback effects within the complex
adaptive system. The primary contribution of this model, compared to prior literature, is that it
combines elements and expands on the models mentioned in the “Literature Review” chapter of
the dissertation.
Furthermore, prior models solely isolated certain breeds of agents and their behaviors (e.g.,
banks or consumers). The model being presented emphasizes and includes the interconnected behaviors and relationships between consumers, banks, and regulatory institutions such as the Federal Reserve. Prior studies typically only incorporated property or consumers as agents (e.g., foreclosure literature), or only banks (e.g., interbank networks); however, I argue that including these
various components and agents is important. For example, if consumers are likely to enter a foreclosure, this has an impact on an individual bank’s balance sheet. Another example may involve
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understanding how interest rates influence the demand for varying types of mortgage products to
purchase a home.
Regarding the consumer-related results of the simulations, I find that clusters of foreclosed
homes have a severe negative impact on neighboring homes. As homes enter foreclosure, this
negatively affects a bank’s balance sheet as well. In addition, monetary policy and control of interest rates by the Federal Reserve play a critical role in the probability of an interest rate foreclosure. With respect to the interbank network results of the simulations, I run various comparative
static experiments and elaborate on the results.
Moreover, this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 will be a review of prior literatures,
Chapter 3 describes the methodology and research design, Chapter 4 analyzes results from the
ABM, and Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks and improvements for future research.

Chapter 2: Literature and Methodology Review
This section will provide an overview of a few core topics that each contribute to the development of the agent-based model presented in this dissertation. The first portion of this section
focuses on comparing agent-based modeling with standard linear methodologies (e.g., OLS regression). It will summarize the current generation of methodologies used by financial institutions
(e.g., banks) and supervisors (e.g., the Fed) for understanding threats to financial stability (stresstesting and portfolio value at risk). Furthermore, this will explain why and how agent-based modeling can be a powerful non-traditional approach for stress-testing and analyzing value at risk.
Additionally, I will review the various claims by researchers as to why and how the housing
bubble occurred. This review will also mention literature that discusses the mechanics of the real
estate market as a major component of the financial system. I would also like to briefly address
that the consumer-related aspects of the model presented in this paper were substantially enhanced
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from a Level 1 Axtell-Epstein (1994) agent-based model developed by a group of researchers at
George Mason University (GMU) (McMahon, Berea, Osman 2009). In addition, this paper focuses
on similar methodologies implemented by Gangel et al. (2013a) to represent the contagion effect
and contributes to real estate, foreclosure, and financial literature. Regarding the interbank network
aspects of the model, I attempt to replicate scenarios and experiments conducted by researchers
such as Nier et al. (2007).

Comparing Agent-Based Modeling and Linear Methodologies
Traditional econometric modeling stems from mathematics to solve for equilibrium.
Agent-based models are bottom-up computational models that use simple assumptions to simulate
individual agent goals and interactive behaviors over time whereas system dynamics is a top-down
approach due to the focus on total system behavior (Gilbert, 2008). Agents can interact with each
other and their environment; therefore, changes in other agents or the environment can lead to
adjustments in an individual agent’s behavior. Ultimately, the combination of rules and interactions contributes to the phenomenon of “emergence.” Researchers are able to run experiments
using an agent-based model to analyze volumes of data based on the agent interactions in a specified environment (Gilbert, 2007; North and Macal, 2007). Several researchers have used this approach to simulate complex real-world problems. Schelling (1971) used the ABM approach to
simulate racial segregation within housing in the United States. Abdollahian et al. (2013a) used
ABM to simulate the Human Development theory and analyze the effects from interactions between economics, culture, society, and politics. Abdollahian et al. (2013b) also utilized ABM to
model SemPro, which simulates how competing interests and barriers impact siting outcomes and
policy for sustainable energy infrastructure. Goldstein (2017) developed a series of ABMs to simulate the housing market in the Washington DC Metropolitan Statistical Area from 1997-2009. As
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Haldane (2016) from Bank of England pointed out in 2016, more and more scholars start to use
ABM to study economic, fiscal and monetary policies, leveraging the model’s capability in studying crisis (Dosi et al., 2015; Geanakoplos et al., 2012).
As mentioned, the housing market is a complex and nonlinear system with a high-level of
heterogeneity. Agents in the housing market are heterogeneous due to preferences, income, risk
appetite, etc. A linear model would only provide us with limited insight given that there are numerous factors constantly changing within the volatile market. According to Goldstein (p. 10,
2017), “Housing market interactions are more complex than many other markets due to search
costs coupled with nonzero costs for waiting, large product differentiation, and the frequent inclusion of mortgage financing.” ABMs have the capacity to handle such complexities compared to a
traditional linear model. The simulation technique allows us to explore variables and relationships,
which are typically difficult to analyze and predict by only using actual historical data. Using
ABM, we are able to adjust various parameters to further understand a variable’s impact on the
simulated environment.
Moreover, it is important to address the cons of using agent-based modeling as a methodological approach. This approach is extremely sensitive to assumptions, since ABMs are ad hoc
models. Developers can build any type of model, which will generate volumes of data based on
the value and construct of specific parameters and inputs. To assure that a model is valid and
robust, modelers should back-test their models using empirical data.

Current Methods for Risk Management: Stress-Testing and Value-at-Risk (VaR)
Financial institutions and supervisors devote much of their resources towards developing
and understanding different types of risk within the financial system. Two popular approaches
currently used to assess and measure risk include: (1) Value-at-Risk (VaR) models and (2) stress
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testing. Value-at-Risk is a metric that determines the amount of potential loss in a portfolio and
the probability of such event occurring over a specific time period. After the 2008 financial crisis,
several domestic and international regulations were implemented requiring the financial industry
to report their capital adequacy and perform stress tests pertaining to scenarios such as a bankruptcy, recession, or crisis. The ultimate goal is to assess if a bank possesses enough capital to
withstand the consequences of such harmful economic scenarios. Stress testing is a regulatory
requirement for banks typically with more than $50 billion assets under management or more per
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act; therefore, these financial institutions are investing resources to ensure
they meet regulatory requirements and have a concrete understanding of internal and external risk
factors.
Bookstaber (2012) emphasizes that weaknesses exist within the current generation of models as they are, “…unable to model financial vulnerabilities, the shocks that might expose these
vulnerabilities, and the process by which such shocks might propagate through the financial system.” Additionally, the author discusses the benefits of ABM and claims that it is a promising
approach as it is flexible and allows us to specify the non-linearities, complexities, and instabilities
within the world we live in. Bookstaber highlights that currently VaR and stress testing rely heavily
on historical distributions and events. Thus, these techniques do not incorporate unanticipated
shocks and the changes in economic relationships during stressful events, which are not necessarily
guided by the past.

Background on the Real Estate Market
Many researchers have analyzed the housing market under different circumstances. For
example, scholars have contributed to literature revolving around the foreclosure of properties
(Khan and Yang, 2018; Vernon-Bido et al., 2017; Seiler et al., 2013; Gangel et al., 2013a, 2013b,
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Colins et al., 2013). With respect to the underwater mortgage literature, Archer and Smith (2010),
underwater mortgages—loans with balances higher than the actual market- value of the property—
were a significant driver for default of payment. Goldstein (2017) developed a series of ABMs to
simulate the housing market in the Washing- ton DC Metropolitian Statistical Area from 1997–
2009. The author demonstrates that leverage (loan to value ratio or LTV) and expectations primarily contributed to the local bubble along with interest rates, income towards housing, and seller
behavior. Goldstein claims that lending standards and refinance rules did not particularly influence
the bubble; however, I will attempt to model these factors over time to assess whether they play
significant roles in the nation’s housing market.
The financial sector, specifically banks, control the supply of loans in the market. Lenders
typically do not hold onto mortgages and have the option to bundle volumes of these products
together. After mortgages are bundled into a single product, they are sold to various investors.
These products are titled residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS or MBS). A pair of researchers developed a hypothesis to assess the action by banks to created MBS products for investors called “originate to distribute” (Bord and Santos, 2012). In other words, the more loans a bank
can originate, the more securitized products such as MBS they can sell to investors.
Additionally, small and mid-sized banks attempted to mimic business strategies similar to
large banks. Before the crisis, large banks had insurmountable MBS portfolios. How were small
and mid-sized banks going to catch up with large banks? These banks evolved into mortgage originating machines, since this was a powerful strategy to generate high-revenue and remain competitive. During this time, a few factors were in place: (1) interest rates were at an all-time low—
which was key for Adjustable Rate Mortgages, or ARMs, because interest rates were fixed for a
certain amount of time (typically 5–10 years), and then home-owners would sell the property just
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before the teaser-rate expired to make a profit and avoid and adjustable rate, (2) Americans wanted
to lock down low-interest mortgages and homes as soon as possible to retain affordable payments,
(3) lending standards were loose, which may be correlated with originating to distribute (Mian and
Sufi 2009); however, Gorton (2008) suggests securitizing mortgages did not lead to these standards
and instead loose standards became problematic for the securitization process. Essentially, once
the initial fixed rate (also known as teaser rate) for an adjustable-rate mortgage expired, borrowers
began defaulting on payments because they were too high while house prices did not appreciate.
As mentioned earlier, researchers have asserted that sub-prime mortgage borrowers, or
high-risk borrowers with low credit scores, played a critical role in contributing to the housing
bubble because with an increase in demand led to an increase in prices (Mian and Sufi 2009).
Given the three factors previously listed, sub-prime mortgages were an easy solution for small and
mid-sized banks to generate high volumes. The financial sector could also innovate trading mechanisms for these products (i.e., credit default swaps), which contributed to the bubble and crash
(Duca et al. 2011). Banks no longer had to be concerned with risk, since investors were only focused on the pricing of securities and not how loans were originated. Ashcraft and Schuerman
(2008) identify this as a principal-agent problem. Gorton (2008) and Khandani et al. (2009) claim
refinancing and the appreciation of home prices contributed immensely to the real estate crash;
however, Goldstein (2017) argues that refinance did not play a critical role. Eventually, investors
understood that the pools of mortgages being purchased may contain sub-prime mortgages and it
was too late.
Researchers have also presented literature on how the international real estate markets operate and change over time by using agent-based simulations, such as the English housing market
(Gilbert et al. 2009). I have included additional agents such as individual consumers and banks
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because their characteristics and behavior play critical roles in the market. In the U.S., ARMs
typically rely on LIBOR, Treasury, and other financial indexes to represent an “interest rate.” Although these rates do not drastically differ from the Fed funds rate, they are not identical values
and do not represent the true components of adjustable-rate mortgages. I incorporate attributes
belonging to individual people such as employment, income, etc. I also argue that changes in home
prices, whether or not the property entered foreclosure, directly impact the property value of neighboring homes.

Foreclosure Discount and Contagion Literature
There is a variety of reasons as to why a borrower may involuntarily default on his/her mortgage such as unemployment, death, etc. Prior to a home legally entering foreclosure, it enters a
stage called Real Estate Owned (REO), which allows the creditor (e.g., a bank) to retain full possession and then sell to another party. When a property enters REO and is no longer occupied, the
property value may diminish due to neglecting maintenance, vandalism, squatting, and more (Harding, Rosenblatt, Yao, 2009; Rogers and Winter, 2009).Moreover, the property sells at an amount
to cover the remaining balance of the mortgage.
Typically, it is in the interest of banks to work with borrowers on a plan for repayment
because foreclosing a property leads to a bank not receiving the income it was anticipating over
the life of the loan. Prior literature estimates the cost of foreclosure to range from $7,200 to $58,759
(Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao, 2009; Rogers and Winter, 2009). As properties within a vicinity enter
foreclosure, the neighboring property values diminish and lead to other properties foreclosing
along with an increase in supply of homes available in the market.
This paper embeds the foundation of similar methodologies developed by Gangel et al.
(2013a) to represent the contagion effect and contributes to real estate, foreclosure, and financial
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literature. Similarly, I incorporate a range of values determined by prior literature to measure the
contagion effect. Researchers have claimed the contagion effect to range from 0.9% to a high of
8.7% (Immergluck and Smith, 2006; Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao, 2009; Rogers and Winter, 2009).
The literature has a consensus on the contagion effect being local among neighboring properties.
I apply the range of 0.9% to 8.7% in the sensitivity analysis.
Prior to Gangel et al. (2013a), contagion effect models implemented a hedonic regression
methodology to analyze the foreclosure contagion effect (Immergluck and Smith, 2006; Harding,
Rosenblatt, and Yao, 2009; Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao, 2009; and Rogers and Winter, 2009). As
Gangel et al. (2013a) explains, “Hedonic models decompose complex, incomparable entities into
smaller, comparable constituents for analysis. Once decomposed, the constituents are evaluated to
determine their contribution to the state of the original entity. In the case of foreclosure contagion,
relationships between foreclosures and neighboring property sale prices are explored by decomposing sales prices with two of the constituents being the number and distances of foreclosures
within the proximity of the selling property.” Gangel et al. (2013a) also build an agent-based
model; however, agents only represent real estate properties and argue that disposition time and
distance of properties are critical for understanding the contagion effect. I have included additional
agents such as individuals/people and banks because their characteristics and behavior play critical
roles in predicting the probability of a property entering foreclosure. I also argue that changes in
home prices, whether or not the property has entered foreclosure, directly impact the property
value of neighboring homes.

Interbank Contagion Literature
Upper (2011) summarizes literature focused on simulations estimating contagion and risk
within the interbank loan market. As the author describes, there are various channels of contagion
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within the banking system. These channels may be related to the liability or asset side of the balance sheet. Upper provides a detailed summary of research affiliated with the different channels
of contagion. For the purposes of this dissertation, I focus specifically on the direct effects from
interbank lending; however, there is certainly opportunity to incorporate the multitude channels of
contagion in future work. Given that one of the goals of this model is to contribute to methods for
preventing contagion within the banking system, the decision to incorporate only one of the channels allows us to focus on the impact related to certain policy measures along with the opportunity
to define precise implications.
I would like to address that I am not arguing that a single channel may lead to a bank failure
or cause detrimental effects to the interbank market. Instead, I am claiming that the cumulative
exposure to various channels may threaten the stability of these systems; therefore, it is important
to incorporate modeling and monitoring techniques to mitigate risk. Upper and Worms (2004)
claims that there is risk for domino effects within interbank lending if a safety net is not present;
however, a safety net provided by institutions substantially reduces the risk of contagion. The authors state that the collapse of a bank may reduce up to 15% of total assets within a banking system.
Contagious defaults have typically been prevented through government bailouts. Financial systems cannot solely rely on government bailouts as a prevention mechanism as it presents a serious
moral-hazard concern and is not guaranteed to happen.
Direct default contagion is the theoretical concept that the occurrence of a default from
one bank may spread a negative impact and risk to the balance sheet of another bank(s). Indirect
contagion occurs due to channels aside from direct relations of the agents such as indirect effects
related to changes in asset prices (Cifuentes et al., 2005; Fecht, 2004), or disinformation that may
trigger a fear of losses among other agents. This may lead to a bank run thus potentially causing a
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negative impact to the asset side of a balance sheet (Dasgupta, 2004; Iyer and Peydró-Alcalde,
2005). Researchers have argued about whether the concept of default contagion truly presents
danger and systemic risk to the interbank system. Elsinger et al. (2006) suggest that default-driven
contagion within the interbank market does not necessarily play a major role, but the authors also
emphasize that the robustness of their conclusion needs to be reviewed by using other datasets
with additional observations and countries. Researchers have also discussed the different types of
unexpected shocks that may negatively impact the banking system. These varying types include
interest rate, exchange rate and stock movements, business cycles, credit, funding, and risk transfer
shocks (Elsinger et al., 2006; Chan-Lau, 2010)
Allen and Gale (2000) demonstrate that the risk of contagion is dependent upon the completeness of the interbank system. According to the authors, structures react to the same type of
shock(s) differently. A “complete” structure, one in which each agent is symmetrically connected
to all relevant agents within the network, is significantly more stable than an “incomplete” structure where a node is only connected to a single node. “Disconnected” structures are also weaker
than a “complete” structure when it comes to the spread of contagion; however, contagion does
not impact every agent in the network. An additional structure is described by Freixas et al. (2000)
where contagion may occur due to all additional agents that are linked to one centralized agent
rather than each other. As Upper discusses, researchers have expanded on these theoretical frameworks by utilizing simulations to understand the risk of contagion in complex systems.

Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology
There are various parameters that may be adjusted through the interface that impact the
model’s output, which are related to specific agents and the global environment. The initial density
parameter determines the density of houses in the world. The rental-house density parameter
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determines how many properties are rental at tick 0, and the percent-occupied parameter generates
the initial number of people. Furthermore, the elements within each agent rely on a random uniform distribution (i.e., income). People choose to live in affordable homes based on their available
income to spend on a mortgage or rent. The tool outputs a variety of results, such as average house
price, average mortgage cost, balance sheets of banks, real and natural unemployment rates, and
more. Additionally, the “world” includes agents such as people, houses, banks and mortgages, and
each tick represents a single month. Income and housing prices are in thousands of U.S. dollars.
People can choose to rent or own one or more houses. Each house can either have a mortgage
affiliated with a bank, or no mortgage at all. Figure 1 demonstrates the interdependent relationships
among the agents and a high-level overview of their attributes.

Fig. 1. Flowchart of the model, which lists entities, relationships and attributes at a high level.

I have chosen to import LIBOR 12-month forward curves to more accurately depict how
these mortgages are modeled. LIBOR 12-month assumes that interest-rates will be adjusted every
12 months. For the sake of simplicity, I do not distinguish teaser and annual adjustable index rates
pertaining to ARM loans for two reasons. First, there are several types of adjustable-rate mortgages
(i.e., 5/1, 7/1, 10/1 etc.). The first number represents the number of years for the fixed teaser-rate;
therefore, a 5/1 would represent a mortgage where the rate is fixed for five years, and then adjusts
once every year for the life of the mortgage. The decision to not include these specific ARM
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products in the simulation allows for the observation of patterns between fixed and adjustable rate
mortgages more clearly. Secondly, the model includes a mobility variable to account for the frequency and fraction of agents that move to different properties. This component allows the model
to reflect the common behavior of homeowners selling their property just before the teaser-rate
expires for ARMs. People choose to sell prior to the expiration of the rate, since ARMs tend to
have lower initial rates than fixed-rate mortgages. Moreover, I have included both fixed and adjustable rate mortgages; however, the reader should note that majority of mortgages in the United
States are fixed-rate products for 30 years. The next subsection will describe the various agents
and variables within the model in-depth.

Agents and Variables

Fig. 2. Snapshot of ABM environment.

People. One category of agents in the model includes consumers (people), and every individual
is randomly assigned an annual fixed income derived from a uniform distribution. These agents
are also assigned credit (FICO) scores to determine the credibility of these borrowers. Additionally, people can be employed or unemployed throughout the simulation runs. If an agent is unemployed, its income is set to zero until it becomes employed again. The foundation for the
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unemployment portion of the model was adapted using components from Michal Kvasnička’s
NetLogo model, which is ultimately based on the traditional macroeconomic theory of unemployment. Every employed agent can lose their job with probability of the job-separation rate. In the
same time, each unemployed agent searches for a job based on the probability of the job-finding
rate. During recessions, the job-separation rate increases whereas thee job-finding rate decreases.
The wealth level of agents plays an important role throughout each simulation run. As displayed in Figure 2, shades of green depict a certain level of wealth where darker gradients represent
high-income earners while lighter the opposite. Once the model initiates, agents assess their financial status to determine if they should relocate, own, or rent. People decide whether they can purchase a primary residence, and if not, they consider the option to rent. If an agent cannot afford
any of the rental properties available at a specific time, it will leave the simulation. People can own
more than one property if their capital investment permits, which provides opportunities to list the
property as rental for others. Under the circumstance that an agent with more than one property
cannot afford all of the mortgages, it will randomly sell one of the properties. The foundation of
the consumer’s decision to rent or purchase a property can be seen in Figure 3 below.
Houses. When the model is initiated, houses are randomly assigned a price, which follows a
uniform distribution of $75,000-150,000. These agents use colors to depict whether a home is a
rental (red), on the path to ownership (blue), foreclosed (pink), or vacant (black). A darker gradient
of red or blue indicates a higher mortgage cost or rent. Links are used to create neighborhoods,
which are constructed by establishing a maximum radial distance. I assume that properties undergo
formal and informal appraisals of property value. Informal in the sense that an owner can determine an approximate appraisal value of the property by researching appraisal values of local and
similar properties recently sold (Ling and Archer, 2009).

15

I also assume that neighboring properties have homogenous physical features, while individuals
who occupy each property may differ based on a distribution. The change in appraisal values of
neighboring properties may influence an agent’s property value through links. Every month, a
random percentage of agents will assess the appraisal value of their property by observing the
change in property values of neighboring homes within a maximum distance assumption. The
foreclosure discount is the negative percentage of price diminishment affiliated with foreclosed
neighbors, and it is a function of the change in price and distance from an appraised property. It is
notated by μ as displayed in formula below. The formulae below outline important variables within
the ABM, which are important for quantifying the effect if a neighboring property has entered the
foreclosure stage:

∆d# = d%&' − d# ,

∆p# = p
;

#
,-.

− p#

,

∆p#
Appraised Value8 = p8 − 9 µ · >p8 +
@
∆d#
where:

#<.

∆AB : difference between the ith property and maximum distance constant (d%&' )
AB : distance from ith property and appraisal property (j)
D: contagion effect severity for a single home
∆EB : price change of ith property from t to t+1
EF : price of appraisal property
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Fig. 3. Decision-making algorithm of agents for renting or purchasing properties. Visual adapted from McMahon,
Berea, Osman (2009), which further demonstrates process of purchasing and selling multiple properties whereas pseudocode (Appendix) relates to renting or purchasing a primary residence.

Mortgages. Mortgages are another type of agent, which are owned and stored by banks; however, they are linked to a specific person and property. All loans include an interest rate, which is
used to calculate individual amortization tables to determine monthly payments. A lag effect is
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introduced to account for people’s reactions to changes in interest rates, which may lead to a refinance opportunity. Moreover, only a random percentage of adjustable rate mortgages will respond to changes in interest rates. This will allow the simulation to properly model adjustable rate
mortgages, where the interest rate is fixed for a specific amount of time and then adjusts to an
indexed rate such as LIBOR. In a future version of the model, mortgages will be bundled together
to create mortgage backed securities—a new product represented as an agent. People will also be
able to prepay mortgages, which will rely heavily on probabilities from a predictive econometric
model as the foundation.
Below is a table to demonstrate how ARMs, fixed-rate mortgages, and rent is calculated:
PRODUCT

EQUATION
r(1 + (g + r));
(1 + (g + r)); − 1
f(1 + f);
m=p
(1 + f); − 1
t=p∗c

ARM

m=p

Fixed- Rate
Rent

Table. 1. Summary of equations for calculating mortgage amortization tables and rent.

where:
m: monthly payment
p: principal amount (in this case, house price after down payment has been subtracted for mortgages)
r: index of choice (in this case, LIBOR 12-Month), which is also divided by 12 to represent your
annual interest- rate
f: Fed-funds rate, which is also divided by 12 to represent your annual interest- rate
n: number of expected payments you will make for the life of the loan
g: For ARMs, this represents the additional spread or margin applied to the index rate
t: rent
c: fractional constant
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This model also uses Cont’s formula (2005) to represent the effect of aggregate demand on
prices:
r, = ln
where:

S,
Z,
= g> @
S,Q.
N

TU : return on house price at time t
VU : house price at time t
WU : excess demand for houses at time t
N: number of agents
g(x) = x, which is the appreciation or depreciation of house price, can then be represented as
excess demand by solving for S, .

Banks. Each bank has a balance sheet to monitor its assets and liabilities, which is simultaneously initialized with the interbank network. These agents are connected with each other via links,
which allows for the ability to incorporate risk exposures within the interbank market. Nonbank
and interbank interactions contribute to the asset and liability side of each bank’s balance sheet.
External assets, which includes loans (i.e., mortgages) and securities to non-financial institutions
and households, are captured within the assets side of the balance sheet. Each time an individual
borrower reduces the principal balance of the loan by making a monthly payment, earning assets
is reduced whereas cash is increased by this amount plus the interest payment. If a house undergoes
foreclosure, this will negatively impact the assets portion of the balance sheet as the bank is not
earning the interest dollars it expected over the life of the loan. Interbank assets include loans
(earning assets) which are represented by edges that create the interbank network, and these assets
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are composed of cash as well. The liability side of the balance sheet is composed of deposits and
interbank borrowing. Together, these factors contribute to the balance sheet of the bank agents.
The steps and equations below, which describe the initialization of balance sheets in the system,
are heavily influenced by Nier et al. (2007) and Klinger and Teply (2014); however, I have revised
the equations as the model presented in this dissertation contains several additional elements (e.g.,
mortgage-level products, non-financial agents, etc.). Table 2 below summarizes the parameters
included within the balance sheet initialization and Table 3 summarizes the components that make
up the balance sheet of an individual bank.
1) The model’s total external assets (E) is calculated as: (1) the collective sum of unpaid principal mortgage balances and cash (M), which are initialized and calculated throughout the
simulation as described in the previous sections and (2) securities plus additional external
financial assets denoted as (Q). Securities and the other external assets are calculated by
simply multiplying an input parameter percentage (p) by the aggregate value of each bank’s
mortgages and then summing the two components to ultimately derive the system’s total
external assets. The purpose of this is to account for the weighting and differentiation in
size of each bank’s balance sheet. The ratio of interbank assets to total assets q is an input
parameter, which allows total assets T to be calculated with respect to the initial aggregate
value of external assets.
E=M+Q
Q=M∗p
T=

(M + Q)
(1 − q)
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2) The aggregate value of interbank assets is therefore calculated using the equation below,
which represents a percentage of the total assets in the system.
I = qT

3) The value of a single bank link s is calculated with respect to the total number of outgoing
links U from all banks in the model.
s=

1
U

4) Therefore, each bank’s interbank assets i# and liabilities v# are determined based on their
connections within the interbank network.
i# = s ∗ total number of incoming links
v# = s ∗ total number of outgoing links

5) Each bank’s net worth n# is ultimately defined as the delta between total assets and liabilities. Given that external liabilities have not been calculated at this stage, the model offers
capital ratio g as an input parameter which is then multiplied by the bank’s total assets a#
to determine the agent’s net worth.
n# = g ∗ a #
6) Finally, external liabilities (i.e., deposits) d# are calculated to complete the balance sheet
initialization.
d# = a# − n# − v#
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Parameter
E=M+Q

Interpretation
Sum of external assets (mortgages and securities)
Ratio of interbank assets to total assets
Total assets (external + interbank assets)
Erdös–Rényi probability
Sum of interbank assets
Capital Ratio (Net Worth/Total Assets)
Number of banks

q
T
r
I
g
b

Table. 2. Dynamic parameters within agent-based model.

Assets

Liabilities

Interbank assets (bc )

Interbank liabilities (ec )

External assets (dc )
Total Assets gc

External liabilities (fc )
Total Liabilities hc
Net Worth ic

Table. 3. Components of an individual bank’s balance sheet.

Incorporating Regulatory Requirements
Per federal regulation, banks are expected to meet liquidity requirements by retaining high quality liquid assets (HQLA), which can easily be liquidated in the market even during a time of stress.
This requirement attempts to ensure that institutions possess enough regulatory capital to account
for unanticipated events such as bank runs. The capital requirements for each bank are determined
through multiple variables with a primary focus on the types of assets held by an institution and
the associated risk. HQLA is typically composed of Level 1 and Level 2 assets where certain assets
are subject to haircuts. Table 4 below distinguishes some examples of Level 1 and Level 2 assets.
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Level 1 Assets

Level 2 Assets

Cash

Certain securities and bonds

Marketable Securities

Residential Mortgage Backed
Securities (RMBS)

Table. 4. Components of Level 1 and Level 2 assets.

For simplistic and demonstrative purposes of this model, the tool assumes banks are holding
Level 1 assets to avoid the application of haircuts. These assets are high quality and primarily
liquid. The denominator, total net cash outflows, is defined as the delta between total expected
cash outflows and inflows where outflows are represented as liabilities and inflows as contractual
receivables.
Each tick, banks are constantly calculating their liquidity coverage ratios (LCR) to ensure they
are obliging with the Basel Accords (i.e., Basel III). The LCR requirement was created in to make
sure that banks are holding enough high-quality liquid assets to fund 100% of cashflows for 30
days, and it is broadly considered one type of stress test. For simplicity, The LCR can be summarized through the following formula where a value of 1 (100%) or greater demonstrates that the
agent has met the liquidity requirement under Basel III:

jklc =

mbnℎ pqghbrs jbtqbf uvvdrvc
wxrgh ydr kgvℎ zqr{hx|vc

Similar to Klinger and Teply (2014), the ABM is capable of testing for the effects of capital
regulation within the model. In addition to the liquidity coverage ratio, banks are expected to meet
a capital adequacy ratio (CAR), which is also formally known as the capital to risk weighted assets
ratio (CRAR). Each tick, banks are monitoring their CAR to ensure they are compliant with
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regulation. If the ratio of a bank’s net worth to its assets is less than the capital adequacy (

}~
•~

<

CAR), the bank exits the system (similar steps as if it defaulted), which translates to the removal
of the agent by regulators as it is non-compliant. First, the bank sells its assets to repay external
liabilities, and then its interbank liabilities. Under the condition that a bank cannot repay its interbank liabilities, it transfers the loss to the creditor banks. Secondly, the system must account for
claims of debt owed by other banks. The model assumes that these claims are sold to an agent that
is exogenous to the model; therefore, the amount of interbank liabilities owed to the non-compliant
bank is transferred to the external liabilities portion of the balance sheet. The following pseudocode
in Figure 4 summarizes these steps:

Capital Regulation – Non-Compliance
For each bank
If the ratio of net worth to total assets < capital adequacy ratio requirement
Implement non-compliant rules below, and then exit system:
Transfer of Claims from Non-Compliant Bank to Creditors
Sell assets and first repay external liabilities
Then repay interbank liabilities
If bank cannot repay interbank liabilities
Uniformly transfer loss to creditor banks
Transfer of Claims from Debtors
If bank is linked to non-compliant bank as debtor
Convert interbank liability amount to external liability

Fig. 4. Pseudocode describing steps for incorporating regulatory requirements (i.e., capital regulation).
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Additionally, as Klinger and Teply (2014) describe, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) cannot be
set as an input parameter given that the initial capital ratio g is already an input parameter and
varies during the parameter sweeps and sensitivity analyses. Thus, CAR can be determined by the
following formula where Äc represents the removal ratio and it is a binary variable:

Äc =

kulc
gc

The CAR requirement is expressed as a percentage of the initial capital ratio. A value of 0 means
that no banks cannot be removed as regulatory enforcement is not present. A value of 1 corresponds to the initialized capital being equivalent to the CAR requirement, and the ability for regulators to remove banks exists. Therefore, a bank will exit the system if its capital ratio is below
the initialized level.

Types of Shocks
Within the ABM, there are different types of shocks that may occur within the system. At the
people level, shocks may be introduced which impact levels of unemployment. Each time a shock
scenario is applied, the “job finding” and “job separation” rates are impacted. The job separation
rate is the probability of an individual person becoming unemployed, and the job finding rate is
the probability of an unemployed person becoming employed. Under the recession scenario, the
job finding rate is decreased which translates to a lengthier job search related to the difficulties of
seeking employment during recessions, and the job separation rate is increased to represent a high
probability of layoffs. Under the high welfare scenario, unemployment benefits are increased;
therefore, people may be more inclined to reject job offers or take more time to find a job, and the
job finding rate is decreased. Under the low welfare scenario, unemployment benefits are
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decreased; therefore, people are actively searching for immediate employment and the job finding
rate is increased. Finally, the good times scenario implies that unemployment benefits and job
finding and separation rates are at a regular level (i.e., the average between the high and low welfare scenarios). Under the economic boom scenario, a percentage of people experience an increase
in their income. This percentage is dynamic and can be adjusted while using the tool or during
sensitivity analyses.
According to Bookstaber (2012), an agent-based model focused in this area “…should allow for
the range of shocks that are typical in causing and propagating a crisis. These include a seizing up
of liquidity; a fire sale in the face of forced deleveraging with the subsequent funding and liquidity
effects; a sudden funding impairment, which is often brought on by a shock to real or perceived
credit worthiness or liquidity; or in the extreme case, the failure of a firm posed as an exogenous
event.” Moreover, similar to Klinger and Teply (2014) and Nier et al. (2007), I incorporate the
concept of shocks within the interbank system with a few caveats to represent the range of shocks.
There are two types of shocks within the system: (1) local and (2) global. Local shocks translate
to a dynamic portion of a single random bank’s external assets (non-mortgage portion) being removed from the balance sheet. These can be thought of as shocks related to operational risk such
as fraud and credit risk. They are classified as idiosyncratic shocks given that one bank is shocked
at a time, which potentially leads to knock-on defaults for the other banks. First, the initial shock
is applied during the simulation to a random bank i which is then identified as the source. The size
of the shock is reflected as a percentage of the bank’s external assets, and this percentage is an
adjustable parameter. When the source has recognized that a shock has been applied, the bank
absorbs the shock in the following order: (1) net worth (2) interbank liabilities and (3) its deposits.
As Nier et al. (2007) describe, this logic implies that consumer deposits are senior to interbank

26

deposits, which are senior to equity (i.e., net worth). If the size of the initial shock rc is greater
than bank i's net worth ic , then the source bank will ultimately default. Proceeding the absorption
of the initial shock through the source bank’s net worth, if the residual loss is less than the interbank
liabilities ec owed by the source bank (rc - ic < ec ), then this residual loss is transferred to the total
number of creditor banks Å linked to the source banks. If bank j is a creditor bank receiving such
loss rÇ , then the value of this loss is calculated as:

rÇ =

rc − ic
Å

Furthermore, if the residual loss is greater than the interbank liabilities owed by the source bank
(t # - n# > v# ), then the remainder of the loss is transmitted to the depositors (t # - n# - v# ). If the
creditor bank does not withstand the shock through its net worth (rÇ ≤ iÇ ), then the creditor will
default due to the contagious effects and will enter the same process previously described until the
shock is completely absorbed. Figure 5 presents pseudocode, which elaborates on the step-by-step
process related to the source bank formally. Global shocks translate to a decrease in external assets
of all banks; therefore, all banks experience a percentage loss to their balance sheets.
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Shock Transmission from Source Bank – Interbank Network
Ask banki (source bank of initial shock)
If size of shocki > net worthi
Then ask banki to default
If the residual loss from the shock (size of shocki - net worthi) < banki interbank liabilities
Then transfer the value of the residual loss to the creditor banks
If the residual loss > banki interbank liabilities
Then transfer remainder of loss to depositors (size of shocki - net worthi - banki interbank liabilities)
Else reduce net worthi by size of shocki

Fig. 5. Pseudocode describing steps for incorporating initial shock and its impact.

Types of Foreclosures
I embed the different foreclosure effects influenced by Gangel et al. (2013a) within the model.
Below is a summary description of each type of foreclosure along with the pseudocode (Figure 4).
Equity Foreclosure. I calculate an equity ratio using the current appraisal value and outstanding
principal balance. If the equity ratio is below one, then the borrower acknowledges the presence
of an underwater mortgage, which leads to an increased probability of the owner defaulting.
Let Cequity be equal to a constant that reflects the effect of the equity ratio:

Ñtqbrs lgrbx =

uÖÖÄgbvdf Üghqd
áiÖgbf àÄbiÅbÖgh âghgiÅd

If Equity < 1,
Ñtqbrs äxÄdÅhxvqÄd Ñ{{dÅr =

(1 − Ñtqbrs lgrbx) ∗ kãåçcéè
áiÖgbf àÄbiÅbÖgh âghgiÅd

If Equity ≥ 1,
Ñtqbrs äxÄdÅhxvqÄd Ñ{{dÅr = 0
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Interest Rate Foreclosure. As previously mentioned, the ABM includes both fixed and adjustable rate mortgages. Fixed rate mortgages are not prone to interest rate foreclosures because the
borrower has agreed to an affordable mortgage; however, ARMs are the opposite. After the fixedrate period expires, the interest rate resets annually following LIBOR 12-month rates in this environment. An increase in interest rates leads to higher payments, which increases the probability of
default whereas a decrease in rates reduces the probability of default. Let C equal a constant that
reflects the effect of the probability of interest rate foreclosure, and let IC equal the percentage
change between the prior and current monthly payments:

ëk =

kqÄÄdir íxirℎhsh àgsìdir
äbîdf àdÄbxf íxirℎhs àgsìdir

ëirdÄdvr lgrd äxÄdÅhxvqÄd Ñ{{dÅr =

(ëk − 1) ∗ k
12

Investor Foreclosure. An investor is likely to voluntarily ignore their mortgage obligation even
when the investor can afford to make payments (i.e., exercise one’s put option) if the renter’s
payment is below the monthly mortgage payment. While Gangel et al. (2013a) do not focus on the
renter market, I chose to include these agents in the simulation; therefore, I can more accurately
represent the investor foreclosure effect. Let Cinvestor equal a constant that reflect the effect of the
probability of an investor foreclosure:

Rent < Mortgage,
ëiedvrxÄ äxÄdÅhxvqÄd Ñ{{dÅr =

kcñóãòéôö
12

Rent > Mortgage,
ëiedvrxÄ Foreclosure Effect = −
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C#;ùûü,†°
12

Catastrophic Foreclosure. A catastrophic event such as job loss may lead to an increase in the
probability of foreclosure. Gangel et al. (2013a) simply include a constant to represent the probability of a foreclosure due to a catastrophic event; however, I only include this constant if the
individual person is actually unemployed in the simulation. Let Ccatastrophic equal a constant that
reflects the probability of foreclosure from becoming unemployed.

Total Probability of Foreclosure. I have described the different types of foreclosure effects,
which ultimately calculate a final probability of a property entering foreclosure based on characteristics pertaining to individual mortgages, homes, and people. The table below summarizes how
each type of foreclosure effect is calculated depending on whether the property is owner/renter
occupied and whether the mortgage has a fixed or adjustable rate.

Type

FRM

Owner-Occupied

Equity, Catastrophic

Rental/Investment

Equity, Investor, Catastrophic

ARM
Equity, Interest Rate,
Catastrophic
Equity, Interest Rate,
Investor, Catastrophic

Table. 5. Summary of foreclosure effects.

As an illustrative example, below is the foreclosure probability for an owner-occupied property
with an affiliated ARM loan and unemployed owner:

P(Foreclosure | ARM, Owner-Occupied)
= Equity Foreclosure Effect + Interest Rate Foreclosure Effect + C#;ùûü,†°
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Calculating Probability of Foreclosure
Catastrophic Foreclosure
If home-owner is unemployed
Apply catastrophic-effect foreclosure constant
Equity Foreclosure
For each property
If Unpaid Principal Balance > 0
Set Equity-Ratio as (Property Value / Unpaid Principal Balance)
If Equity-Ratio < 1
Set Equity-Effect as (1 - Equity-Ratio) * Foreclosure-Constant / 12
Else
Set Equity-Effect as 0
Interest Rate Foreclosure
If Type-of-Mortgage is "ARM" and delta to next tick mortgage cost is > 0
Set Interest Rate ChangeEffect as Interest Rate Change * foreclosure-constant / 12
Investor Effect Foreclosure
If property is a rental and rental income < Mortgage Cost
Set Investor-Effect as Foreclosure-Constant / 12
Else
Set Investor-Effect as (-1 * (foreclosure-constant / 12))
; Calculate Total Probability of Foreclosure
Fig. 6. Pseudocode describing how the model determines the different types of foreclosure effects.
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Fig. 7. Screenshot of interface

Chapter 4: Results
Baseline Run: Focus on People and Houses
This section of the dissertation will discuss baseline runs of the model with applied “shocks”
to generally demonstrate how it performs over time. Given that the tool offers several dynamic
parameters and focuses related to the different agents, I have split the portion of the model related
to banks into a separate section to elaborate on the model’s aspects and capabilities more in-depth.
The baseline scenario is initialized using the default parameter settings, and the goal is to replicate
similar trends pertaining to the housing prices and foreclosure effects during the Financial Crisis.
Figure 7 is a screenshot of the interface after it has been initiated in NetLogo.
In this scenario, I have set the fixed-rate mortgage population to 90% of the pool because
most mortgages in the United States are in fact fixed-rate as opposed to adjustable-rate. I have also
set mobility to 60 ticks (i.e., 5 years) and agents may move at any random tick below that threshold.
Moreover, this will allow us to calibrate towards the behavior of 5/1 ARM homeowners, since
individuals tend to move after the teaser rate has expired. People can place anywhere from a 1025% down payment on their mortgage(s) representing the average range in the United States. I
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have set the foreclosure effect constant to be 35% for all of the types of foreclosures that can occur,
which suggests that any of these effects have the same impact on the probability of foreclosure.
The complete probability of a foreclosure must be equal to or greater than the threshold of 40%
for this iteration, and/or 3 months delinquent on payments. Americans are typically 90 days delinquent on payments before a home enters into the real estate owned (REO) stage. Additionally, the
contagion effect for a neighboring home that enters a foreclosure is 8.7%, which is the upper estimation from prior literature. The neighborhoods are in a maximum radial distance of 2 patches to
represent local communities with similar demographics. As the simulation begins from January
1986 (time 0) and runs until January 2000 (169 ticks), the average foreclosure property has remained quite flat compared to the initiation of the model, but the percentage of foreclosed homes
has certainly fluctuated. Figure 8 displays three graphs, which include: average foreclosure probability, Federal Reserve rates, LIBOR, and the average house price. House prices drastically rose
from 1986-2000. Just before the year 2000, there is a dip in the average house price with a slight
recovery. Fed funds rate and LIBOR have diminished significantly since the initialization of the
model, and these rates are leveraged and assigned to mortgages over time.
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Fig. 8. Line graphs from the interface of the ABM.

By the time the model reaches September 2001, I introduce two “shocks” to the baseline run:
(1) a recession shock and (2) low welfare benefits. This is to account for a 9/11 political shock,
which severely impacted the economy. Although arbitrary, the effects from the shock last until
January 2004, which is after George W. Bush was elected as President of the United States for his
second term. Figure 9 displays that interest-rates continue to remain at an all-time low, and average
price of homes are at an all-time high.
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Fig. 9. Update of graphs by January 2004.

I continue to run the model until approximately Fall 2007 and characteristics of the upcoming financial crisis become apparent. At this period, the average house price peaked and entered a
severe dip representing the burst of the housing bubble. Figure 10 displays the average house price
until April 2017. In this run of the model, the average house price remains extremely high compared to historical prices. There is also a spike in the percentage of foreclosed properties further
demonstrating the foreclosure contagion effect and delinquent payments. Below is an additional
screenshot to see projections of foreclosed homes in 2023 (Figure 11).
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Fig. 10. Average house price by April 2017 and percentage of foreclosed properties.

Fig. 11. Percentage of foreclosed properties in 2009 (left) and 2023 (right).
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Avg. Foreclosures and House Prices
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Fig. 12. Average foreclosures and house prices during sensitivity analysis.
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Fig. 13. Variation of foreclosure parameters for sensitivity analysis.
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Sensitivity Analyses: Focus on People and Houses
I ran 81 different scenarios by using the BehaviorSpace (i.e., parameter sweeping) feature in
NetLogo to perform behavioral experiments and run sensitivity analyses on housing prices and the
foreclosure contagion effect using approximately 31,000 generated observations. Three output variables are measured which may operate as dependent variables to measure the effects from the
foreclosure contagion effect along with additional consumer-level attributes and emergent behavior. The variables include average mortgage, average house price, and total foreclosed properties.
This feature allows the user to list varying values for each parameter to gain a more concrete understanding. Above, Figure 12 plots the average house prices of each property and the average
number of foreclosed homes during each simulation run. Figure 13 displays the inputs for the
different foreclosure parameters per simulation run. Table 6 provides descriptive statistics and
correlation of the dependent variables.
Dependent Var.

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Average Mortgage

31,023

1.277251

0.5862547

-6.060171

3.743937

Average House Price

31,023

519.8349

392.6365

-941.5159

9107.49

Total Foreclosed Properties

31,023

75.5025

113.6511

0

529

Dependent Var.

Average Mortgage

Average House Price

Average Mortgage

1.000

Average House Price

-0.304

1.000

Total Foreclosed Properties

0.187

-0.304

Table. 6. Descriptive statistics and correlation of dependent variables.
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Total Foreclosed Properties

1.000

VARIABLES
Foreclosure constant
Foreclosure thresh.
Max Radial Distance
Contagion effect
Constant

Observations
R-squared

(1)
Total Foreclosed
Properties

(2)
Average
Mortgage

(3)
Average
House Price

782.6***
(4.551)
-715.5***
(4.061)
1.610
(1.145)
14.21
(25.82)
209.0***

-0.167***
(0.0151)
0.131***
(0.0137)
-0.0395***
(0.00436)
-2.920***
(0.0857)
1.466***

-9.618
(7.319)
208.9***
(7.458)
110.3***
(3.072)
-2,165***
(44.61)
292.2***

(3.556)

(0.0118)

(6.594)

31,023
0.654

31,023
0.042

31,023
0.108

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Fig. 14. Pooled regression results.
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Figure 14 shows regression results for the pooled regression. Each dependent variable is
regressed on the same independent variables. The first column indicates that the foreclosure
constant has a positive effect on the total number of foreclosed properties while an increase in
the foreclosure threshold has a negative effect as expected. Distance between houses does not
play a critical role here. The second column regresses average mortgage in the world on the
key independent variables. When the data is pooled together, an increase in the foreclosure
constant, maximum distance radius and contagion effect each independently have a negative
impact on the average mortgage cost. As expected, this indicates that there is more supply in
the market along with lower house prices thus reducing the mortgage cost because the probability of foreclosure among neighboring homes increases; however, an increase in the foreclosure threshold has a positive impact on average mortgage cost because homes are less likely to
enter foreclosure.
Similarly, the third column regresses average house price on the independent variables of
interest. An increase in the contagion effect has a negative impact on average house prices,
which truly demonstrates the foreclosure contagion effect. Property values tend to stay high
with increases in the foreclosure threshold and the maximum radial distance. The maximum
radial distance has a positive impact on average house prices because neighboring homes that
have not entered foreclosure influence a given property.
Furthermore, I ran another 288 different scenarios by using the BehaviorSpace (i.e., parameter sweeping) feature in NetLogo to perform behavioral experiments and run sensitivity analyses on housing prices using over 110,000 generated observations. Table 7 below summarizes
the setup and randomization of parameters for the iteration to compile a total of 288 runs.
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percent-occupied 65

arm-percent 10 30

min-down 0.2

min-income 10

rental-density 40

mobility 60

rental-fraction 0.025

job-finding-rate% 10

max-down 0.25

max-income" 0.20

margin 3 10

initial-density 75

min-price 75 100 125

job-separation-rate% 5

num-banks 5 15

max-price 150 175 200

foreclosure-constant
0.35

foreclosure-threshold"
0.4

fixed-rate-percent" 90
70
contagion-effect 0.009
0.087

Table 7. Setup for the 288 simulation runs

Three output variables are measured which may operate as dependent variables to
measure the macro-political economy of the housing market. The variables include average
mortgage and average house price. Below, Figure 15 plots the ending average house price of
the population against the initial minimum and maximum house prices and average mortgages.
The scatter plot in the bottom-left quadrant represents the phenomenon of underwater mortgages. Typically, one would expect a positive relationship between higher property values and
mortgage costs; however, our sensitivity analysis demonstrates that many individuals at the
end of each simulation run had very high mortgage costs for houses with low property values
on average.
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Fig. 15. Average foreclosures and house prices during sensitivity analysis.

Figure 16 shows a panel of time series plot of core outcome variables from the sensitivity tests. The price of occupied houses keeps increasing over time, though at different pace:
fast at the beginning period and ending period of the simulation, but slower in the middle.
Average mortgage cost shows a completely different pattern. It climbs at the beginning and
reaches the peak very fast, fluctuates at the high level until the time period when house price
starts to rapidly increase, then decreases with some fluctuation. The number of banks with
income from houses stays at the same level across the entire simulation period after the very
first few iterations when actions are taken place. The number of people with no investment
capital has the largest fluctuation. However, as expected, this fluctuation follows the trend in
average mortgage cost. After the mortgage cost peaks, when it goes high, the number of people
with no investment capital also peaks.
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Fig. 16. Time series plot for core variables from sensitivity analysis.

Below, Table 8 quantifies the correlation between some of the important variables included in our agent-based model. The average house price and mortgage cost have a strong
negative relationship, which further illustrates that higher property values do not necessarily
imply a higher mortgage cost. The population of ARMs versus fixed rate mortgages was adjusted throughout the sensitivity analysis; therefore, exceedingly high mortgage costs may be
attributed to an increase of the ARM population along with the spike in interest rates this product exhibits once the teaser rate expires. Additionally, this sensitivity run highlights the dilemma of underwater mortgages, which may lead to an increased probability of delinquent
payments and eventually foreclosure.
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Average
Mortgage
1.000
-0.4769
0.0520
0.0657

Dependent Var.
Average Mortgage Cost
Average House Price
Minimum House Price
Maximum House Price

Avg House
Price
1.000
0.1554
0.1318

Table 8. Correlation of variables.

Figure 17 shows the pooled regression results from our generated data. The results indicate that increases in initial minimum and maximum house prices lead to higher house prices
on average regardless of how the agents behave and adjust their goal-oriented decisions. To
reiterate, houses tend to be an asset that appreciates over time; therefore, an increase in the
initial minimum and maximum house price will lead to a higher peak when assessing the property values in the world. This demonstrates the sensitivity of the initial input values for these
variables, and the significance of understanding the property value distribution in a specific
geography when we analyze the real world. Moreover, an increase in the percentage of adjustable rate mortgages tends to influence higher house prices on average, whereas an increase in
fixed rate mortgages presents the converse. ARM products tend to be more affordable than
fixed rate mortgages in the short run; therefore, an increase in the availability of these products
to consumers will increase the ability and demand to purchase a home, which will increase the
overall property values in the specific “neighborhoods” of the world. As displayed in the results, an increase in the population of fixed-rate mortgages tends to have a negative impact on
house prices given that these products are more expensive; therefore, reducing demand.
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VARIABLES
Min. House Price

Average House Price
2.188***
(0.0386)
1.856***
(0.0379)
0.388***
(0.0770)
-11.74***
(0.0770)
1,013***
(8.775)

Max. House Price
ARM (%)
Fixed Rate (%)
Constant

Observations
110,299
R-squared
0.209
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Fig. 17. Pooled regression results.

Comparative Static Simulation Runs: Focus on Banks and Interbank Network
The primary parameters within the model for constructing the banking system each simulation include: net worth as a percentage of total assets (i.e., capital ratio) ( g), the percentage
of total assets related to interbank assets (q), the Erdös–Rényi probability of 2 nodes being
connected if this feature is used (r), and the number of banks (b). Given the granularity of the
model by incorporating mortgage products, I do not keep external assets fixed as Nier et al.
(2007) does. The agent-based model presented in this dissertation includes several more agent
types (i.e., houses, people, and mortgages, along with their respective attributes) and sensitivity
analysis parameter combinations than prior agent-based models related to this topic. For example, this agent-based model is capable of combining the phenomena of both foreclosure and
interbank contagion. Moreover, the parameters related to houses and people follow the baseline
parameter settings described in the previous relevant section. This allows for mortgages to be
modeled similarly to how financial institutions model these products, which allows you to
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assess risk for each individual mortgage throughout the life of the product. In other words, the
loan supply in the market is not fixed.
Financial institutions are absolutely capable of creating a wide variety of financial products; therefore, it is important for such simulation models to be capable of including such products as they are created for different reasons (e.g., ARM products intended for individuals in a
house for a specific period). Given that this section is the baseline or benchmark run with
varying parameters, I will follow Nier et al.’s experimental methodology on focusing on comparative static; therefore, these will be experiments where a single parameter is varied at a time
but I will also report on situations where two parameters are simultaneously varied. Note that
this section will not focus on the regulatory aspects of the model and will be demonstrated in
the following section. Additionally, interest rates will not be flowing from the Federal Reserve’s federal fund rates nor the LIBOR curves. Instead, the model will randomly assign interest rates within a range (3%-7% for the benchmark experiment to include mortgages that
may have been assigned high rates during a specific time period). Adjustable rate mortgages
will have their rates reassigned within the same range as well.
As benchmark criteria, the parameters will contain the following values unless the parameter is of focus to be varied: net worth as a percentage of total assets ( g = 5%), percentage of
interbank assets related within total assets (q = 20%), Erdös–Rényi probability (r = 20%),
number of banks (i.e., nodes) (b = 25). As mentioned above, I will vary one of these parameters
per experiment while keeping the other parameters fixed. Table 9 provides a list of parameters
and their corresponding value(s) under the benchmark criteria and variation range.
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Benchmark
5%

Sensitivity
Range
1-10%

Erdös–Rényi probability

20%

10-100%

Percentage of interbank assets

20%

0-50%

25

10-25

Parameter
Net worth

Number of banks
Table 9. Parameter benchmark values and variation ranges.

The model runs for 50 ticks per simulation with a given combination of parameters to
allow for the balance sheets to be calculated, and then the local shock is applied before the
final tick. The initial shock is calibrated to clear out 100% of external assets for the chosen
bank to align with Nier et al.’s calibration. Additionally, this will also allow us to see how the
likelihood of contagious defaults may differentiate when external assets are not a fixed parameter and instead calculated using differentiating behavior at the agent-level (e.g., people, mortgages, houses). For each combination of parameters, I repeat this exercise 10 times and then
report based on averages. This will allow us to analyze how many of the banks defaulted while
varying the specific parameter of focus.
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Fig. 18. Screenshot of agent-based environment with bank links incorporated to create interbank networks.
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Experiment #1: Net Worth and Contagion

Number of Bank Defaults

25
20
15
10
5
0
0

2

4

6

8

10

Percentage Net Worth

Fig. 19. Average number of defaults as a function of the capital ratio (net worth as a percentage of total assets)
by running model for 50 ticks and repeating parameter combinations 10 times.

The first experiment is focused on the variation of net worth as a percentage of total assets.
Figure 19 illustrates the results, which is the average of the experiment running for 50 ticks,
repeated 10 times, and inclusive of percentage of net worth varying from 1-10%. Noticeably,
when the percentage of net worth is low (i.e., 1-3%) a substantial portion of the banking agents
default as the shock cannot be absorbed by the net worth portion of their balance sheets which
is similar to findings of Nier et al. (2007).
Moreover, there is a negative relationship between bank capitalization and interbank contagion. As the net worth increases, less banks default; however, contagion does not diminish
linearly as bank capitalization is increased. When net worth is valued towards the upper bound
(e.g., 10%) majority of the initial shock is absorbed by the source bank. When net worth decreases, the second-round default occurs as the creditor banks become exposed and the loss is
transmitted to their balance sheets. The net worth is not low enough to generate further rounds
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of default as net worth remains large enough to absorb the shocks. As soon as net worth is
within the 1-3% range, a cascade effect takes places and a substantial amount of the banking
agents default given that the net worth cannot absorb the shocks. Multiple rounds of default
are experienced. The results from this experiment imply that low levels of aggregate net worth
can lead to contagion within the interbank network causing multiple rounds of default due to
the initial shock experienced by a source bank. Moreover, this demonstrates how the sensitivities within the percentage devoted to net worth can impact banks even if they do not experience the initial shock themselves.
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Experiment #2: Interbank Lending and Borrowing and Contagion
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Fig. 20. Average number of defaults as a function of the percentage of interbank assets within total bank assets.
by running model for 50 ticks and repeating parameter combinations 10 times.

The second experiment is focused on how the size of interbank borrowing and lending impacts the number of bank defaults. As previously mentioned, Nier et al. (2007) hold external
assets constant while increasing the percentage of interbank assets; however, the model presented within this dissertation does not hold external assets constant nor at a fixed amount. The
number of links is fixed given the implementation of the Erdös–Rényi construct; therefore, an
increase in the percentage of interbank assets corresponds to an increase in the weight of the
link (i.e., the size of the lending relationship). Additionally, net worth is calibrated as a percentage of total assets; therefore, an increase in interbank assets leads to an increase in aggregate net worth.
Figure 20 demonstrates the results for the simulation runs. As the percentage of interbank
assets related to total assets increases, the number of banks that default decreases. This may be
related to the notion that the transmitted losses are not large, and the overall net worth is
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increasing as a result of an increase in the size of the interbank market and total assets; therefore, banks are holding capital against interbank exposures. Additionally, parts of the shock
are also absorbed by consumer deposits. Ultimately, this protects the banks against the contagious effects resulting from the propagated shocks. Spikes in the figure (e.g., at 20%) may be
related to an increase in the transfer of the loss resulting from the shock to the creditor banks
during the simulation runs. As illustrated, on average, the number of defaults does not tend to
be larger than 9 banks defaulting throughout this experiment. This is related to the net worth
of the source bank and the creditors absorbing a large portion of the initial shock given that
interbank assets have increased for all banks, and a smaller portion is transmitted to agents in
further rounds. Furthermore, this experiment demonstrates that increases in interbank assets
tend to help banks absorb contagious effects as the bank holds capital against interbank exposures.
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Experiment #3: Interbank Network Connectivity and Contagion
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Fig. 21. Average number of defaults as a function of the probability of connectedness with respect to simultaneous variation of percentage of net worth. Includes running model for 50 ticks and repeating parameter combinations 10 times.

The third experiment focuses on the effect of connectivity on contagion within the interbank
network. As a simultaneous varying parameter, I also fluctuate net worth to be 1% and 7% to
illustrate how the combination influences the number of bank defaults. The horizontal (x) axis
in the figure is the Erdös–Rényi probability, which implies higher levels of connectivity as the
probability increases. The blue line represents an input parameter of 1% net worth and the
orange line represents 7% net worth of total assets. The combination of the parameters presents
an interesting insight. Increases in interbank linkage allows for shocks to be transmitted across
the systems more easily; however, it also allows for shocks to be absorbed more easily by the
net worth of the other banks. Figure 21 presents the results from the experimental runs and
demonstrates that this concept almost leads to an M-shaped graph, which is somewhat similar
to Nier et al. (2007)’s findings. When the Erdös–Rényi probability is low, there is an increase
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in bank defaults since the low level of connectedness may lead to transmission of the shock.
When the connectivity is in between the upper and lower bound range, we see a fluctuation in
the number of banks that default; however, typically as connectivity approaches the upper
bound of the range, there seems to be lower levels of bank defaults as the impact from contagious effects diminishes given that the shock absorption technique begins to take place. Moreover, a larger portion of the banking population is capable of withstanding the shock.
Figure 21 also displays the interdependent relationship between connectivity and net worth.
When net worth is 1% of total assets, a large portion of the banks still default as they are unable
to absorb the shock through the net worth portion of their balance sheets. Moreover, the interbank linkages transmit the shocks rather than absorb it. When net worth is 7% of total assets,
we still notice bank defaults but at a substantially lower rate than when net worth was 1%.
Therefore, the results imply that higher levels of connectivity with low levels of aggregate
banking capitalization are more inclined to suffer from contagion than systems with higher
levels of connectivity and aggregate banking capitalization.
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Experiment #4: Concentration of Banking System and Contagion
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Fig. 22. Average number of defaults as a function of the size of the shock as a percentage of external assets for
varied number of banks. Includes running model for 50 ticks and repeating parameter combinations 10 times.

The final experiment focuses on the effect concentration (number of banks) within the system has on contagion given the variation in interbank connections. In order to vary the concentration of the system, the number of banks ranges from 10 to 25 banks where 10 corresponds
to the highest level of concentration and 25 banks corresponds to the lowest level of concentration. As a simultaneous varying parameter, the percentage of external assets calibrated to
represent the shock size also varies.
Figure 22 illustrates that regardless of how concentrated the banking system is (i.e., 10 or
25 banks), as the size of the shock increases relative to the portion of external assets, the number of bank defaults also increases denoting a positive relationship. Nier et al. (2007) found
that for a given shock size, there is a higher risk of contagion as the system becomes more
concentrated (i.e., as the number of banks in the system decreases). Their finding is a result of
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maintaining a fixed level of total assets and excluding the diversification of agents and attributes that exist in the economy (e.g., people, houses, interest rates). In other words, as the number of banks decreases, the size of each bank’s balance sheet is larger given that the same value
of total assets is held constant. As a result, the bank is large enough to have a substantial impact
on the entire system. The result presented in Figure 22 implies that is not necessarily true as
external assets may vary through each simulation run depending on this aspect of a specific
bank’s balance sheet. This is a more realistic approach as not all banks maintain similar sized
balance sheets. Moreover, higher levels of concentration may allow for more banks to absorb
the shock through their balance sheets thus withstanding the contagious effects.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Research
This paper shows the power of simulation as an additional approach to scientific inquiry and
builds on previous agent-based models of the real estate and financial markets. With respect to
the experiment focused on housing and people, the results of the scenario simulations emphasize a tremendous influence from the abilities of the Federal Reserve to control interest rates,
banks to lend to each other, and consumers to make timely payments. The Fed’s control over
interest rates continuously demonstrated a real estate bubble bursting around 2007 regardless
of how the combination of parameters differentiated. The model incorporates many complex
features representing real characteristics of consumers and banks.
After I set up the full model in the baseline run that was focused on houses and people, I
conducted a number of sensitivity analyses and assessed variables that influenced the probability of foreclosures. This paper demonstrates that properties entering foreclosure certainly
have an impact on neighboring properties. With respect to the banking aspects of the model, I
demonstrate the power of using agent-based modeling to incorporate the non-linear aspects of
interbank networks. I utilized a different methodological approach by performing comparative
static experiments while allowing for consumers to behave and interact as they would have in
the previous simulation runs. Comparative static experiments allow for the isolation and variation of specific parameters to see how they influence the number of bank defaults during the
simulation runs. Additionally, the network structure relied on the implementation of the Erdös–
Rényi construct.
Future iterations of this model and experimental runs will certainly incorporate additional
parameters; however, the interbank portion of this dissertation provides insight into how net
worth, size of the interbank market, connectivity, and concentration of the banking system
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influence the number of bank defaults. These types of experiments may be useful for both
banks within the private sector and central banks of countries especially given the demand to
meet regulatory requirements and robust portfolio management. Financial institutions tend to
place an emphasis on stress testing, sensitivity analyses, Monte Carlo simulations, etc. as part
of risk management. As previously mentioned, these experiments are guided by the methodological approach of Nier et al. (2007). With respect to net worth, the findings imply that percentage net worth of assets certainly influences the level of contagion within banking systems.
As the net worth percentage diminishes, the number of bank defaults increases; however, it
should be noted that this is a non-linear relationship. When the percentage net worth of total
assets increases, the banking system is more likely to withstand the shock to the system as it is
absorbed. This is one parameter that allows us to understand systemic risk(s) within the banking system more thoroughly.
The second experiment focused on increasing the size of the interbank market by increasing
the percentage of interbank assets related to total assets. In this specific experiment, the results
differentiated from Nier et al. (2007). The results from this model implied that overall aggregate net worth increases as a result of an increase in the size of the interbank market and total
assets. In other words, banks held capital against interbank exposures. This ultimately suggests
that banking capitalization requirements may prevent banking systems from experiencing systemic breakdowns from shocks. The diversification of assets also helps. By retaining interbank
assets, this may help protect banks from shocks related to a different asset type on their balance
sheets.
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The third experiment focused on how connectivity within the interbank market impacts contagious defaults. The results suggest that low connectivity with increases in the number of links
transforms shocks into transmitters rather than absorbers. The latter, that is links act as shock
absorbers, occurs when the connectivity within the network is high. I was also able to demonstrate the interdependence of this concept and bank capitalization by running the simulations
with a range of net worth. As connectivity increased while the net worth percentage was low
(i.e., less capitalized) there was a higher number of banks which defaults and thus were impacted by contagious defaults. Although banks still defaulted when the net worth percentage
was increased, a substantially smaller portion defaulted; therefore, this demonstrated that net
worth once again acts as a significant absorber of shocks.
The final experiment related to the interbank networks varied the concentration of the system
and size of the initial shock. One commonality of the findings with Nier et al. (2007) relates to
when the size of the shock increases, relative to the portion of external assets, the number of
bank defaults also increases denoting a positive relationship. However, again, some of the
findings differentiated from Nier et al. (2007) as their model does not incorporate a diverse set
agents within the economy (e.g., people and varied levels of total assets). The findings from
the experiment in this paper imply that higher levels of concentration may allow for more
banks to absorb the shock through their balance sheets thus withstanding the contagious effects. Certainly, if the system was less concentrated and included banks with extremely large
balance sheets, then perhaps the system may withstand rounds of contagious default; however,
the financial markets are composed of banks from small to large and may have different impacts due to this diverse attribute.
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Most importantly, this agent-based model still has plenty of features that may be included to
further model the real estate and financial markets within the United States. As I continue to
expand on this model, I would like to place more emphasis on adding features to represent
MBS trading, sub-prime mortgages, credibility and debt-to-income ratio of borrowers, credit
default swaps, quantitative-easing (another Federal Reserve tool), Dodd-Frank Act, lending
standards and deregulation, etc. Additional agents will include rating agencies such as Standard
& Poor (rating agency), Fannie and Freddie (government-sponsored enterprises), and construction companies to control the supply side and pricing of homes. Another necessary component
for the model is the ability for borrowers to prepay and refinance mortgages. In summary,
agent-based modeling is a valuable tool and can help us monitor and prevent systemic risk in
the housing market, and it allows us to gain a better understanding of emergence and interconnectedness in the “world.” Finally, the interbank network aspect of this dissertation demonstrates that there are numerous opportunities to experiment with topics such as liquidity risk.
Also, within this model, there is the opportunity to experiment with variations of parameters
and attributes related to different types of agents. For example, we can experiment with distributions of income related to people, house prices, foreclosure contagion effects, and specific
aspects of balance sheets such as net worth.
The primary purpose of this dissertation was to demonstrate how we must possess a diverse
set of tools when attempting to model aspects of the real world. In this case, the housing and
financial markets. I am simply recommending that central and private sector banks expand
their analytical tools to appropriately analyze the non-linear world we live in. The 2008 Financial Crisis was a clear demonstration of how weak risk tools, disinformation, etc. may lead to
a catastrophic event that can impact the entire globe. By incorporating approaches such as
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agent-based modeling, we can possess one more tool to our toolbox to mitigate risk and contagion.
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Appendix

Initial Steps: Rent or Purchase Decision-Making Algorithm for a Single Property
If consumer is a renter
Ask if consumer can afford to rent property
If yes
Rent house, relocate, and check financial status
Else
Exit system
If renter is solvent
Ask if renter can purchase primary residence
If yes
Purchase primary residence
Else
Check financial status
Else
Exit System
Else
Ask if consumer can afford to purchase primary residence
If yes
Purchase primary residence
Else
Ask if consumer can afford to rent property
If yes
Rent house, relocate, and check financial status
Else
Exit system
If renter is solvent
Ask if renter can purchase primary residence
If yes
Purchase primary residence
Else
Check financial status
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